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1. Introduction 
 
One characteristic of developing countries is low fiscal capacity and smaller government 
relative to the size of the economy, compared to that of richer developed countries and 
emerging economies (Brazil); see Table 1. Low fiscal capabilities constrain state capacity: 
the manifold functions of the state in terms of guaranteeing security, social protection, 
economic management and the provision of a host of other public goods. It has been argued 
by Tilly (1992) that for Europe, historically, state building and war making were 
inseparable, leading ultimately to enhanced state capacity amidst widening spheres of 
government activity.  The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the relationship 
between war, particularly in its dominant form civil war, and the fiscal capacity of the state 
for contemporary developing countries.  
 
Table 1: State Capacity in Selected Developed and Developing Countries in 2010 
 
Country Government Expenditure as a 
per cent share of GDP 
Taxes as a per cent share of 
GDP 
UK 45.8 35.0 
Germany 48.8 36.3 
Brazil 40.6 34.4 
India 22.4 17.7 
Congo,  Democratic Rep. of 22.9 13.2 
Ethiopia 21.8 11.6 
  Source:     OECD Tax Statistics 2011; Planning Commission of India; World Bank 
 
 The functions of the state are important in maintaining the cohesiveness of society, and 
sustaining the social contract between rulers and the ruled, and different factions within 
society. Besides a legitimate Weberian monopoly over violence, a functioning state must be 
able to enforce laws, property rights and contracts, as well as have the fiscal capacity to 
raise revenues and provide public goods (Mill, 1848). A modern state must also be able to 
provide a wider range of public goods (health, education for example), in addition to a 
capacity to regulate and manage markets. More affluent nations have bigger governments 
(as measured by the share of government consumption in national income). Economic 
decline in ‘failing’ states severely undermines the state’s fiscal capacity, something which 
can make it heavily aid dependent (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). Aid dependence, in turn, 
can further diminish state capacity. Furthermore, a ‘failing’ state’s ability to guarantee 
personal security, property rights and laws is often compromised, leading to the gradual 
privatisation of violence between predatory and defensive elements within society. 
Individuals rely on kinship based groups and local warlords for security and public good 
provision; this in turn heightens the risk of civil war as society descends towards an 
anarchical, Hobbesian, state of nature. In the contemporary developing world the lack of 
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fiscal/state capacity enhances civil war risk; civil war in turn further attenuates fiscal 
capacity by destroying pre-existing fiscal institutions that used to garner revenues for the 
state. Thus, the lack of state capacity increases the risk of civil war.      
State capacity is essential for sustained growth with equity, which is the major 
challenge for developing countries. The size of government and growth may sometimes be 
negatively correlated, but the state has minimum functions associated with security, law 
enforcement, securing property rights and the enforcement of contracts. Human capital 
formation is also central to newer growth theories, and much of this education is usually 
publicly provided. All of this requires that the state is able to command resources for its 
activities, and public goods provision; richer countries tend to have bigger government 
measured by the share of government consumption in national income. 
 
Curiously, war may have facilitated the development of state capacity in Europe 
since the 15th century (Tilly, 1992). The development of the modern European state was 
closely linked to external war: war made the state and the state made war. A prominent 
feudal oligarch might establish a monopoly of violence within a society previously 
characterized by competition amongst competing warlords. The coercive activity of state-
making (removing rivals and challengers to the sovereign’s power) was complemented by 
other wars against external enemies, as well as protecting the interests of his support 
group. These activities require resources, initially funded by the means directly at the 
ruler’s disposal or tributes exacted from the population, particularly in conquered regions.  
 
Gradually, as war became more and more complex, requiring larger forces which 
had to be maintained for longer periods, other sources of finance (newer taxes or 
borrowing from merchant capitalists) had to be explored and invented. The path chosen 
could be more coercive in countries more dependent on agriculture (Tsarist Russia), or 
more capital intensive in states engaged in more merchant capital based activities (the 
Dutch Republic), or a mixture of the two. It should be noted that a reliance on land and 
agricultural taxes require a more elaborate bureaucratic machinery such as in Prussia, 
compared to the dependence on trade and other indirect taxes (the 17th century Dutch 
republic). Be that as it may, it compelled the successful ruler to enter in to bargains with 
wider sections of the population (landlords and/or merchants). A wider administrative 
structure unfolded, leading to the gradual development of laws, fiscal institutions, 
accounting systems, academies and schools to train state functionaries. The sovereign had 
to invest in state, especially fiscal, capacity so as to be able to levy taxes and oversee their 
smooth collection. Some wars advance the economic interests of the sovereign’s richer 
subjects, such as during mercantilist wars of the 17th to 19th century. This will prompt the 
political support of the merchant and nascent capitalist classes, and they will not object to 
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the sovereign’s gathering revenues for further and more efficient war making against their 
common (economic) foes, provided he respects their property rights and develops legal 
frameworks facilitating contractual capital formation.   
 
Further down history, as the scale of war increased requiring more specialized 
equipment and larger standing armies, more revenues and administrative capacity became 
necessary. Tilly (1992), for example, points out fiscal innovations like the income tax in 
Britain during the Napoleonic wars in 1799, and the rise in share of government revenues 
to GDP from 15-24% in the same country during that period did much to lay the 
foundations of future British state capacity. Increased taxation and conscription compelled 
rulers to make concessions to wider sections of the population. This meant more 
representative government, and augmentation of state activities towards regulating 
production, manipulating distribution, providing social protection; in short more and more 
public goods, until we arrive at a point where military expenditure, even if increasing in 
absolute terms, becomes a smaller segment of total government expenditure. Monopolized 
trade related rents lead to the accumulation of capital, followed by economic growth, even 
industrialization in some cases. Industrialization and modern economic growth, however, 
require technical progress, which reduces the dependence on a war making state, as it is 
competitiveness and not exclusive trading rights that drives profit, a process, which is 
aided by free trade and domestic public goods that enhance factor productivity.   
 
In a nutshell, war leads to the development of state capacity, primitive accumulation 
and in some cases metamorphoses into modern manufactures based economic growth led 
by technical progress. A history of making war against a nation’s common external enemies 
may lay the foundations for future state capacity, and assist nation building, as it lays the 
basis for fiscal and legal institutions. This process, however, may not apply to internal 
conflict, which often undermines institutions, and interest in the provision of public goods.   
 
Does this narrative, if valid, have any relevance for developing countries at present? 
Most developing countries commenced their post-colonial existence with reasonable 
institutions and state capacity. The last quarter of the 20th century, however, witnessed 
growth and development failure in many parts of the developing world (especially in 
Africa). This phenomenon is also referred to as state failure, particularly in the discourse of 
strategic and international studies. Associated with these developments, state capacity has 
declined in many countries, and several of these nations have also experienced civil war, 
which is widely believed to attenuate state capacity even further. Other developing 
countries (including those not experiencing civil war) are characterized by factional 
politics, with governments, even democratically elected ones, serving particular group 
interests. These states have little interest in providing common interest public goods to its 
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entire citizenry, but instead will concentrate on using the state’s resources to reward their 
own faction via political patronage. Patronage substitutes for wide ranging public goods. 
Thus, state capacity as measured by government expenditure as a proportion of national 
income may be low, but tax revenues as a share of national income will certainly be smaller 
in factionalized states where patronage is widespread; the state may rely on overseas aid 
and its ability to directly command resources, royalties and rents.  
  
In a series of papers Besley and Persson (2008, 2010) have developed models of the 
endogenous investment by present-day rulers in state and legal capacity for future use by 
society. Legal capacity is similar to the good economic institutions essential for economic 
growth in long-run in the spirit of the currently fashionable arguments disseminated by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005).  The development of legal capacity enhances 
growth, which in turn increases the revenue base of the state. Fiscal capacity formation in 
particular, is a costly investment and the returns are in the future. In a factionalized society 
state capacity to finance a public good in the future depends on whether the revenues are 
put to uses (public goods) that enhance the utility of all members of society, not just the 
incumbent group in power. The purest form of a common interest public good is national 
security expenditure directed against external threats, and Besley and Persson (2008, 
2010) do not consider other public goods such as education, health and infrastructure. In a 
society where there are no national (common) interest public goods a factionalized society 
emerges; the state taxes everyone but uses the revenues to make transfers only to its own 
followers (who in effect pay negative taxes). The state’s incentives to invest in state 
capacity are further attenuated by political instability, possible violent challenges to the 
state via civil war (which eliminates the need for common interest public goods provision), 
and an economy where a large share of national income emanates from natural resource 
rents (that do not require the production relations of manufacturing or agriculture).  Besley 
and Persson (2010) conduct some preliminary empirical investigation of their propositions 
and find support for their assertions, but much more systematic analysis is required using 
time series econometric techniques to address the reverse causality between war, 
especially civil war and fiscal institutions, and to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
between countries. This is what we do in our paper. 
 
The next section presents a simple theoretical model explaining the absence of 
common interest public goods in factionalised societies that may lead to outright civil war. 
Section 3 discusses our econometric modeling strategy for analyzing the effect of war on 
state fiscal capacity, including dynamic panel data and country fixed effects techniques. 
Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 discusses sensitivity tests. The long run 
multipliers are presented in Section 6 while additional robustness tests are reported in 
Section 7.  The final section concludes the paper.  
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2 Theory 
 
Our theoretical model is meant to motivate the empirical work that follows on the 
determinants of the state’s fiscal capacity. In this section, however, we will refer to state 
capacity more generally. Following Besley and Persson (2008, 2010) we have two groups 
in society (S): a politically incumbent group another faction in opposition, denoted by a 
subscripts I and O respectively. We will examine three degrees of political factionalism 
indicated by common interest public goods, another situation where each group benefits 
from a specific club good provided by the state, and a scenario of outright civil war (or 
equivalently a repressive state) when both groups fight over a prize or rent, and there are 
no common interest public goods across political factions. We reduce our theoretical 
analysis into a one period decision making process that has implications, both for the 
present and future, as present investment in state capacity enhances both current and 
future income, unless there is internal war.  
 
To begin with the first (common interest scenario), the utility (UI) of the group in power 
is1: 
UI = GS + [1-tI](GS)YI(GS)+ φR         (1) 
 
For the opposition: 
 
UO = GS + [1-tO](GS)YO(GS)+ [1 – φ]R       (2) 
 
GS refers to the provision of common national interest public goods across both factions of 
society. It directly enhances the utility of both social groups equally, and is non-excludable 
and non-rivaled, also enhancing the productivity of national output. In other words, it is not 
solely military expenditure directed for defense against a common external enemy as in 
Besley and Persson (2008, 2010), but includes social sector expenditures such as on 
infrastructure, health and education which enhance productivity in the economy and 
promote growth.2  
The parameter t, refers to the tax rate imposed on income, Y to finance the public 
good to group I in equation (1) and for group O in equation (2). Hence, [1 –t]Y represents 
disposable income. The ability to raise revenues rises with the provision of the common 
                                                     
1 We assume that each group has resolved the collective action problem, and participation and incentive 
compatibility constraints of group members have been met.  
2 GS can be composed of social sector spending, Ss and military (security) spending MS. An increase in military 
spending can therefore crowd out social sector spending out of a given budget.  
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interest public good, which in turn enhances the state’s fiscal capacity. A high value of GS 
may also be indicative of better quality institutions, as state (fiscal) capacity is greater. 
 
The last term R refers to a rent, which is shared according to some partisan rule. 
Rents can be composed of natural resource revenues, fungible foreign aid or a purely 
political rent extractable when in office.3 A fraction φ accrues to the incumbent group in 
equation (1), and a proportion 1- φ is the share of the opposition in (2). Alternatively, φ 
can be viewed as the probability of remaining in power in the next period for the 
incumbent, and 1 – φ the probability that the opposition gets into power in the next period; 
enlightened self-interest (a rule that does not produce latent or open conflict) dictates that 
these correspond to the group’s population share. Sometimes, an enlightened dictator can 
choose shares (φ and 1 – φ) according to some rule that reflects population size and 
political weight, effectively employing inclusiveness to avoid having to either fight or 
repress the opposition.   
 
 Observe that we are stating that the rent (whether natural resource, patronage or 
foreign aid based) does not enhance state capacity even if it is used for public good 
provision rather than private distribution. This is in line with the arguments of Ghani and 
Lockhart (2008) that foreign aid does not add to state capacity, but can be an alternative 
(foreign) source of public good provision, as well as Ross’ (2001) assertion that when 
resource rents finance public goods, obviating from the need to tax, this retards the 
accountability of the state and democratic development (no taxation, no representation). In 
equations (1) and (2) the rent, R enters into utility in an additive, separable fashion, so that 
increases in both Y and R enhance utility. However, to maintain constant utility in the face 
of a decline in R, there has to be an increase in Y, which requires state capacity. By the same 
token, countries experiencing resource booms may have less incentive to enhance state 
capacity, if their reliance on produced income, Y, diminishes, thus experiencing classic 
‘Dutch’ disease effects both in their macroeconomy and in the political economy sphere.   
 
 Maximising utilities in (1) and (2) with respect to GS and setting we obtain: 
 
1 + [1-tI]YIG = tIGYI           (3) 
 
And 
  
1 + [1-to]YOG = tOG YO          (4) 
                                                     
3 In the case of natural resource royalties we are referring to rent: that is the revenue available after extraction 
costs. 
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In (3) and (4) the marginal benefits of the common interest public good are on the left hand 
side, and the right-hand sides correspond to marginal costs. An additional subscript, such 
as G, refers to a partial derivative with respect to that variable. In this common national 
interest equilibrium the state will equalize tax rates for both groups (tI = tO), and both 
groups will accept this voluntarily as it enhances individual, group and national income. 
This is also the utilitarian (greatest good of the greatest number) outcome.  
 
 What if there is a degree of polarization and factionalism between the two groups? 
In this case we may choose to rewrite the utility functions (1) and (2) as:   
 
UI = αGI + [1-tI](GI)YI(GI)+ R         (5) 
 
UO = [1 –α]GO + [1-tO](GO)YO(GO)       (6) 
 
Where GS = αGI +[1 –α]GO 
 
In this case, the common interest public good becomes akin to a group specific club 
good (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). These are non-rivalled, and each member of the club (or 
group) can enjoy the good, but somehow it is excludable for the outside group. This 
happens in states that are multi-ethnic with different languages, religions, histories of 
division and vastly competing economic endowments. Here the state collects the revenues 
for the public good and apportions a fraction α to its own group and a proportion 1 – α to 
the opposition. One may assume that the more factional the state, α increases, and in the 
limit as α→1, we have a completely partisan state that taxes the opposition but gives it no 
benefit, instead appropriating all the revenues for its own group. Only the politically 
incumbent group enjoys the rent, R, and no thought is given to the future consequences of 
excluding the opposition.  Maximisation of (5) and (6) with respect to GI and GO yields: 
 
α + [1-tI]YIG = tIGYI          (7) 
 
And 
  
1 -α + [1-to]YOG = tOGYO         (8) 
 
When we compare (7) and (8) with (3) and (4) this situation may not produce less 
provision of the public goods, but may engender demands for greater autonomy (if α is 
more than proportional to population share of the incumbent), and calls for fiscal 
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federalism in terms of setting tax rates and deciding on public expenditure priorities.  Here, 
tI,GI and tO,G) are not necessarily equal.   
 
 Finally, we have the possibility of outright repression by the incumbent of the 
opposition, and civil war. In this case, φ = 1, with no national provision of public goods to 
the opposition. Also, there is no direct utility from public goods, although indirectly it 
enhances utility for the governing faction by increasing the productivity of private goods. 
  
The utilities of the two groups become: 
 
UI = [1-tI(GI, FI)]YI(GI, FI)+ ψ(FI)R         (9) 
 
UO = [1-tO]YO(FO) + [1- ψ](FO)R          (10) 
  
Here both sides violently contest the rent R, utilizing a fighting effort F; ψ and 1- ψ are the 
probabilities of success in this civil war for the government and rebels (opposition) 
corresponding to a Tullock (1967) type contest success function.4 We also, postulate that 
civil war has a negative influence on income for both sides, because of the negative effect 
on existing institutions, damage to infrastructure and the endowments of each group. For 
the government (or incumbent) side there is still a group specific public good (besides its 
fighting expenditure against the rebels) that enhances income of the group, but its total 
taxes now have to finance fighting the opposition also: 
 
 GI = tIYI - FI           (11)  
 
There are fewer resources available to enhance growth and productivity. The opposition 
group has an endowment, YO from which a proportion tO is taxed to finance their war effort, 
and there are no group specific public goods that enhance productivity for the opposition.  
 
Maximizing (9) and (10) with respect to FI and FO: 
 
ΨFI R + [1-tI]YIFI= tFIYI         (12)  
 
[1-ψ]FO R + [1-tO]YOFO = tFOYO        (13) 
 
                                                     
4 The probability of success depends on own military effort compared to total military effort by both sides scaled 
upwards or downwards by a military decisiveness parameter.  
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Where the left hand sides represent the marginal benefit of fighting (gaining the rent or 
prize) and the right hand side its marginal cost. Observe, that the second term on the left-
hand side is negative, civil war adversely impacts on income by undermining institutions, 
and because of collateral damage to endowments. Clearly, the incentive to fight the other 
faction rises with the value of the resource rents (R) available for capture by either group 
relative to the income loss due to civil war. Hence, civil war will be less likely the greater 
the share of produced income (Y).  
 
Maximizing (11) with respect to GI yields: 
[1-tI]YIG = tIGYI          (14) 
The marginal benefit of the public good (YIG) will be smaller than before (utilizing (11)), 
and the marginal cost (tIG) will be greater again from (11). Some revenues have to be 
diverted to fighting internal rivals, something that does not increase state capacity or the 
productivity of produced income. Thus, in the state of civil war there is diminished 
investment in state capacity, even when compared to the non-violent factional outcomes in 
(7) and (8), and none for the opposition; a large share of revenues are used to fight a 
domestic foe. Furthermore, during civil war existing state capacity and institutions may 
also be undermined. Thus, there is a two-way (reverse) causality that may be operational 
during civil war; it creates lesser incentives for investment in state capacity; the state 
capacity that does exist may atrophy and decay. 
 
In a purely repressive equilibrium, where the opposition is unable to mount a 
challenge against the ruling faction, ψ = 1, and the government uses part of its resources 
(FI) to suppress an opposition group that is unable to fight back; R is not contestable 
between the two parties, and of course the incumbent power (state) does not share rents 
or public goods with rival groups.  
   
 
3. Methodology and Variables 
 
Given the theoretical underpinnings discussed in the previous section for the lack of 
common interest public goods, our objective is to empirically analyze the effect of war, 
especially civil war, on the fiscal capacity of the state in the contemporary developing 
world (between 1980 and 2010), specifically the effect of war (our data sources for conflict 
are described in detail in the appendix) on the tax-GDP ratio. We do not look at government 
expenditure, because total state spending may be financed not only by taxation and 
borrowing, but also direct access to rents, royalties, state trading monopolies and foreign 
aid (as indicated for Ethiopia and the Congo in Table 1). The state may also rely on inflation 
taxes, and manipulate the exchange rate to capture more resources for itself (we proxy this 
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via a dual exchange rate variable). We will proxy the nature of the state through 
governance and political variables. A poorly governed state, with weak institutions will 
have less fiscal capacity. It is particularly difficult to find data on the quality of governance 
prior to the late 1990s, with the exception of the economic freedom index described in the 
appendix. As far as the political nature of the state is concerned we use the Polity scale, 
which ranges from -10 for a perfect autocracy to 10 for a mature well functioning 
democracy. There are possibilities in between, most developing countries fall into a 
category called anocracy (with Polity scores between -4 to 6—which means it has 
characteristics of both democracy (elections) and autocracy (unconstrained executives). 
More democratic states are more accountable and have more common interest public 
goods, meaning that their fiscal base is likely to be larger. We also use the political 
repression index (see appendix), more repressive states may have narrower tax bases for 
the theoretical reasons outlined above. We also postulate that Presidential (as opposed to 
Prime Ministerial) systems are more authoritarian, as challenges (impeachment) is more 
difficult in these instances; most developing countries are Presidential. We also include an 
oil exporter effect, the impact of ethnic fractionalisation and aid as independent variables. 
These are likely to reduce domestic resource mobilization.  We utilize the size of the 
economy (GDP), and per-capita GDP as control variables.    
 
An important complication in empirically studying the impact of conflict on state 
capacity is the potential for endogeneity biases as a result of measurement error, reverse 
causation, and omitted variables. Reverse causality is a concern when examining the link 
between state capacity and conflict, since greater fiscal capacity might lead to lower 
conflicts either because higher tax revenue reduces some of the causes of internal conflicts, 
or because it leads to more income inequality which fuels more discontent and conflict.  
Moreover, omitted factors can explain both the evolution of conflict and of fiscal capacity, 
also leading to biases in the estimated impact of conflict on fiscal capacity. 
 
We try to address these concerns by using several different estimators. First, we 
conduct estimations including country and time fixed effects to account for unobserved 
country characteristics and for common shocks and trends across countries.  In order to 
address biases due to reverse causality, we run regressions lagging all regressors one 
period and we conduct dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimations à la Arellano and Bover (1995), using lagged regressors as instruments. Finally, 
we perform instrumental variables (IV) estimations to try to address, in a more direct 
manner, the potential endogeneity of conflicts arising from measurement error, omitted 
factors, and/or reverse causation. We use two sets of instruments based on characteristics 
of the sample countries: (a) measures of economic conditions in sample countries and (b) 
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variables that capture the views held, and the policies pursued by policy-makers with 
respect to conflicts. 
 
We empirically examine the link between state capacity and conflict by estimating a 
number of variants of Eq. (15) 
 
TAXit =  α0 + α1Cit + β’Xit + δ’Dt + µit       (15) 
 
where i refers to the country and t refers to the time period included in the study. TAX is 
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP and measures state capacity. A complete list of countries 
and years is given in the Appendix Table 1. Appendix Table 2 provides definitions and 
sources for each of the variables in our estimations. 
 
The matrix X in Eq. (15) refers to a set of variables that the literature has found to be 
related to fiscal capacity. In all estimations we control for the size of the economy, defined 
as the log of GDP in constant US dollars, and the level of economic development, as 
measured by per capita GDP. These variables are included on the grounds that fiscal sector 
development entails fixed costs that become less important the larger the size of the 
economy and the richer the country. Also, GDP per capita can proxy for the quality of legal 
institutions in the country, which have been shown to have a positive impact on revenue 
collection. In all models, we also control for inflation, measured as the annual percentage 
change in the GDP deflator.  
 
Current and capital account openness have also been found to have a positive effect 
on government revenue. Following Gupta et al (2009), we include two variables to control 
for the degree of capital and current account openness. First, we include a dummy for the 
presence of dual exchange rate regimes — a measure of capital account restrictions. 
Second, the ratio of imports and exports to GDP proxies for current account openness. 
Finally, the EFI variable represents the economic freedom index. 
 
We first examine the link between state capacity and conflict by running estimations 
with country and time fixed effects to control for unobserved country characteristics and 
for common shocks and trends across countries. These estimations should help lessen 
concerns about endogeneity due to relevant omitted factors. Also, to reduce concerns about 
reverse causality we lag all regressors in our estimations. 
 
To address the potential bias due to reverse causality, we conduct estimations using 
two lagged values  of the regressors as instruments in a GMM dynamic framework à la 
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Arellano and Bover (1995). In particular, Eqs. (16) and (17) , are estimated as part of the 
dynamic system GMM estimates 
 
TAXit =  α0 + σTAXi,t-1 + α1Cit + β’Xit + δ’Dt + µit      (16) 
 
TAXit - TAXi,t-1  =  α0 + σ(TAXi,t-1 - TAXi,t-2)  + α1Cit + β’(Xit - Xi,t-1)  + δ’Dt + (µit - µi,t-1) (17) 
 
In Eqs. (16) and (17), the use of instruments is required to deal with the likely 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables and with the fact that in both equations the error 
term is correlated with the lagged dependent variable. 
 
While using lagged values of the regressors as instruments can help deal with the 
problem of reverse causality, it does not address biases arising due to measurement error, 
since lagged values of the regressors are likely to suffer from this problem as well. 
Therefore, we also estimate Instrumental Variables (IV) estimations where we use external 
as opposed to internal instruments. In particular, we use two-period lagged economic 
conditions such as GDP per capita and inflation. Given space constraints, these results are 
not presented here but are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
We now proceed to test our model on a sample of 79 countries. The choice of countries is 
strictly determined by the availability of consistent data on all the variables. We consider five 
types of variables in the estimation process: the fiscal variable, conflict variable, control 
variables, governance indicators, and other explanatory variables. The analysis uses a panel  
data set with data averaged over 5-year periods from 1980 to 2010.  The averaging of the data 
helps to reduce the possibility of short-run cyclical movements affecting the results. 
 
The CONFLICT variable refers to the use of armed force between two parties, of which 
at least one is the government of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Fifty-one 
countries in the sample are categorized as conflict countries. Depending on the intensity of the 
conflict, we allow for three conflict categories: Low, Medium, and High corresponding to the 
alpha-numeric ranking 1, 2, and 3, respectively. From our sample, 29 per cent of countries are 
high conflict nations, 22 per cent medium conflict, and 14 per cent low conflict countries. The 
remaining 35 per cent of the sample include countries with no conflict. These countries are 
assigned a rank of zero.  
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A number of control variables are used in the models. The rationale for using per 
capita GDP as one of the control variables is straightforward: richer nations tend to have 
better scores in governance indicators, and to have more solid and mature fiscal institutions.  
 
The indicators of economic freedom capture the likely impact of governance in the 
context of risk and prudential regulation prevailing in that country. They not only show how 
governments are elected, monitored and replaced, but also their capacity to formulate and 
implement public policies effectively as well as the attitude of the electorate and their 
representatives toward the institutions that govern economic, political, and social 
interactions. 
 
Thirty three countries in the sample are from Africa. An African dummy variable is 
therefore used to capture adverse geographical, neighborhood, and conflict effects. First, to 
set the stage, the 51 conflict-prone countries in the sample are ranked by the intensity of 
the CONFLICT variable. State capacity, TAX, is inversely related to CONFLICT across the 
three groups shown in Table 2. The asterisk next to the average TAX variable in the 
countries with low intensity conflict, 0.257, indicates that this ratio is significantly larger 
than in the countries with medium conflict intensity (at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed, 
homoskedastic t-test, i.e., assuming equal variance), as indicated by the t-statistic within 
parentheses below. The critical t-value is 1.66. Likewise, the average TAX variable for the 
middle conflict intensity group, 0.142, is significantly larger than in the high conflict 
intensity countries. The F-value in the bottom line, 10.58, also exceeds the critical value, 
2.89, indicating significant differences among the three average values of TAX reported (at 
the 0.05 level). Thus countries with high conflict intensity tend to be associated with lower 
average values for state capacity, TAX. In fact, the figure for high conflict economies is 
nearly a quarter of that for low conflict countries, indicating a significantly lower tax 
receipts as a proportion of GDP in high conflict countries. 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 3. Each regression equation uses a 
balanced data set using various years from the sample 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 
and 2010. The point estimate and the absolute values of the corresponding t-statistics are 
reported. The results reported in Column (1) in Table 3 is for a baseline specification, over 
an extended sample period, that does not control for fixed effects and does not take 
persistence into account.  The estimates show a negative relationship between conflict and 
tax revenue but it is significant only at the 10 percent level. The signs of the coefficients of 
the other control variables, except per capita GDP, are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs.  
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However, these results should be treated with caution as they may be driven by the 
omission of initial conditions. These conditions are potential determinants of both 
contemporaneous fiscal capacity and the probability that a country initially entered a 
conflict. To address the limitations of OLS regressions, we estimate the effect of conflicts on 
fiscal capacity in a specification that takes into account country fixed effects and the 
potential of persistence over time. In particular, we use a dynamic panel data model, which 
allows us to capture the effect of past fiscal capacity and country fixed effects on current 
fiscal capacity, while addressing endogeneity problems. This approach also implies that we 
focus on relatively short run effects of conflicts on a country’s fiscal capacity, as only 
within-country variability is taken advantage of. 
 
Column 2 reports results for the fixed effects specification. To lessen concerns about 
endogeneity, we have lagged all appropriate regressors by one period.  Turning first to 
variables other than those related to conflict, the pattern of coefficients is broadly as 
expected. The results are much better than those reported for OLS regressions in Column 
(1). All the coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. The results 
confirm that fiscal capacity is positively correlated with a country’s size and level of 
income, but negatively associated with inflation and the adoption of multiple exchange rate 
regimes.  
 
By introducing country fixed effects and the lag of the dependent variable in the 
model, Column (2) takes into account the possible effects of initial conditions, a country’s 
level of development, other sources of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, and 
persistence in state capacity. At the same time, the specification is subject to the problems 
of endogeneity for the lagged dependent variable that are standard in dynamic panel data 
models (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Also, both fiscal capacity 
and the probability of facing conflicts may be affected by third shocks that are unobserved 
by us (e.g. political reform). This would introduce additional endogeneity problems, 
directly related to our variables of interest. Reverse causality is also possible, since current 
fiscal capacity may affect the probability that a conflict involving the state occurs. 
 
We address these problems by implementing a one-step ― dynamic System GMM 
estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). We consider fiscal 
variables as a predetermined regressor in our model, and the conflict measure as an 
endogenous variables, given the possibility of both reverse causality and simultaneity bias. 
Our instrument for the lagged dependent variable is its own first lag, while we instrument 
all other endogenous variables with their own second lags in the differenced equation. The 
results we report correspond to a specification where, say, GDP is considered exogenous, 
but the effect of conflict on fiscal capacity is not changed if inflation is considered as an 
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endogenous variable; however, in the latter case instrument proliferation impedes an 
appropriate evaluation of the join exogeneity of instruments. It should be noted, in any 
case, that the causality from fiscal capacity to GDP should materialize mainly in the long 
run; given that we control for country fixed effects, and thus focus on within country 
variability, declaring GDP as exogenous in the present setting is not implausible (Cardenas 
et al 2010).  
 
It is worth mentioning that the System GMM estimator requires that the first 
differenced instruments used for the variables in levels be uncorrelated with the 
unobserved country effects. We make this assumption in all our estimations. That is, we 
assume that the first differences of both our lagged values of fiscal capacity and 
contemporaneous values of conflict are uncorrelated with any country-specific 
characteristics. While the levels of conflict and fiscal capacity must be correlated with 
country fixed effects, it seems plausible to assume that changes in these dimensions do not 
reflect fixed characteristics of countries. 
 
The estimates of the system GMM are, in principle, fully consistent. The diagnostics 
are satisfactory: the Arelano and Bond (1991) tests for first and second order serial 
correlation in the differenced equation suggest that, consistent with the underlying 
assumptions, the former is present but the latter is not; and the Hansen statistics seems 
tolerable. Strikingly, conflict now emerges as both substantially larger and more significant. 
 
For the GMM estimates, the Table reports serial correlation tests, a Sargan test, and 
a Difference Sargan test. The serial correlation tests are used to examine the null 
hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation and no second-order serial correlation, 
respectively, in residuals in first-differences. Given the errors in level being serially 
uncorrelated, we would expect to find significant first-order serial correlation, but no 
significant second-order correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions is used to examine the overall validity of the instruments by 
comparing the sample moment conditions with their population analog. The Difference 
Sargan Test, proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) , is used to test the null hypothesis that 
the lagged differences of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the errors in the 
levels equations. 
 
The GMM estimate provides strong evidence that the reduction in conflict is 
associated with increased tax receipts of the government, and the diagnostic tests, 
including the first-order and second-order serial correlation tests, Sargan test, and the 
Difference Sargan test, are supportive. In general, the coefficients on the GDP growth, per-
capita GDP, and EFI are positively signed, while the coefficients on inflation, multiple 
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exchange rate regime, trade are  negatively signed. The interaction term of Africa and 
conflict is also negative. 
 
5. Sensitivity and Robustness 
 
The robustness tests include the following dimensions: the use of spline regressions, and 
the reduction of the instruments set. 
 
Spline regression:  By using spline regressions, the paper further analyzes nonlinearities  
with respect to the tax revenue and conflict.  A spline specification with two breaks allows 
for the effect of tax revenue to be different at low, medium, and high  levels of tax revenue 
and for low, medium, and high levels of economic freedom (see Cordella et al., 2009). The 
results confirm the absence of nonlinearities with respect to the tax revenue. 
Instruments set: The robustness of the initial results are also checked using different lags of 
the instruments for the lagged dependent variable as well as other endogenous variables in 
the differenced equation. There are no qualitative changes in the result thus confirming the 
robustness of the findings. 
 
6. Long run impact multipliers 
In order to analyze the effect of a change in each explanatory variable on TAX, the 
comparative statics method described in Chowdhury (2001) is utilized to calculate long run 
impact multipliers. These multipliers measure the change in endogenous variables in the 
long run given a unit change in the explanatory variable and are reported in Table 4. Table 
5 summarizes the ranking of the variables considered so far. The values suggest that in our 
sample countries conflict, economic freedom indicator, and GDP have a significant adverse 
effect on fiscal depth. 
 
The presence of CONFLICT is found to be extremely costly in terms of a long-run 
reduction in fiscal capacity. The presence of high intensity conflict is, for example, 
responsible for a long-run reduction in state capacity, as measured by the tax/GDP ratio of 
1.12 per cent. The corresponding reduction in countries with medium and low intensity 
conflict are 1.04 and 0.91 per cent, respectively. More interestingly, a reduction in the 
intensity of conflict from high to medium would lead to a 7.7 per cent drop in the reduction 
in tax receipts due to conflict. A similar shift from a medium to low intensity conflict would 
lead to a 14.3 per cent drop in the reduction in tax receipts caused by conflict. Hence any 
policy measures that would reduce the intensity of conflict would go a long way to 
enhancing the revenue capability in the developing countries. 
Among the variables considered, the presence of conflict, in the countries with high 
intensity conflict, has the highest long-run adverse effect on state capacity. In high intensity 
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conflict countries, economic freedom indicators and inflation follow conflict in their 
adverse effect on state capacity. A worsening of the economic freedom indicators reduces 
state capacity by 1.04 per cent while a similar worsening in the inflation rate leads to a 0.88 
per cent reduction.  
 
Interesting results are found in the medium and low conflict intensity countries. The 
CONFLICT variable is no longer the largest contributor to the long-run adverse impact on 
state capacity. In both groups of countries, the CONFLICT variable follows EFI and GDP in 
its effect on the state capacity. The net impact on tax receipts of each of these variables are 
smaller in magnitude than the results for the high conflict intensity countries. This 
confirms our previous findings that the more intense the conflict, the higher will be the 
magnitude of the adverse effect that other variables have on state capacity. 
 
Overall, the value of the multipliers from the countries with no conflict (last column in 
Table 4) are smaller in magnitude than those from the conflict-prone countries. EFI, GDP 
and Inflation  have the highest long-run adverse effects on depth. The EFI variable leads the 
list with a value of 21.84 per cent and is followed by the GDP  at 1.25 per cent.  
 
7. Additional Estimation 
 
We have also run a number of GMM systems with various permutation of the variables. In 
Tables 6 and 7, we report some of the results. The other regressions (not reported) support 
the general conclusions shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
POLITY variable - Alternative Measures of Democracy: To test the robustness of our 
results to different measures of political democracy across different estimation techniques, 
we replaced the Fraser Institute’s EFI variable in regressions  from Table 3 with two 
different alternatives,  and reran these specifications using several different panel-data 
estimation methods. The first is the Polity index, which ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 
+10 (full democracy). The second is a measure of democracy taken from Isham et al 
(1997)using a composite of indicators of the effectiveness of the legislature vis-a-vis the 
executive, the competitiveness of the political nominating process, and freedom of group 
opposition (each of which are scored from one to three). The Polity and Banks measures 
are both rescaled to yield indicators that range from zero to one. We reran regressions in 
Table 3 using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator.  All results are 
consistent with our previous findings. 
 
Table 6 starts with the base system GMM equation in column 1. This is the same equation 
from Table 3 from the paper and used for comparison purposes only. In Column 2, we have 
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re-estimated the GMM equation replacing the EFI variable with the POLITY variable. The 
Polity variable is positive and statistically significant showing that democracy leads to 
higher tax capacity. All other variables retain their signs and statistical significance. Conflict 
has a statistically significant and negative impact on tax capacity (Tax revenue/GDP ratio). 
 
Political Repression variable - This represents the political terror scale. We replaced the 
conflict variable with the Political Repression variable (1-5 scale with higher numbers 
reflecting more terror/repression). The results are very promising. We have run a number 
of GMM estimations using the political repression variable and its impact on state capacity. 
The results consistently show that higher political repression reduces tax revenue and 
state capacity. In column 3 of Table 6, the results are given. Political repression has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on state capacity as measured by Tax 
revenue/GDP ratio. Other variables are significant and have the expected signs. When we 
replaced the EFI with Polity and ran the same estimation (results not reported here), the 
results didn't change qualitatively. 
 
President Dummy - In Table 7, we re-estimated the GMM system with President dummy. 
Countries with presidential system set to 1 and countries with parliamentary system set to 
0. However, the results showed that the president dummy variable was negative but 
statistically insignificant. We tried a number of different permutations of the model but the 
presidential dummy variable was never significant.  
Cold War: The end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
had a dramatic effect on the general level of armed conflict in the global system. The levels 
of both interstate and societal warfare declined dramatically through the 1990s and this 
trend continues in the early 2000s, falling over 60% from their peak levels. In order to 
statistically test this impact, we have re-run the GMM estimates for two sample periods – 
Cold War 1980-1990 (reported in Table 8) and post-Cold War 1995-2010 (Table 9). We 
have used EFI or POLITY; and CONFLICT or Political Repression as independent variables. 
Different combinations of variables were tried. The GMM results didn’t change much. 
 
However, interesting results occurs when we calculate the long run multipliers – the 
various intensity of conflict are more significant and have greater impact on tax 
revenue/GDP during the Cold War period than in post-Cold War period. Conflict has lost 
some of its adverse impact on state capacity after the cold war ended. The introduction of 
the Presidential Dummy variable still doesn’t make the variable statistically significant in 
either the Cold War or post-Cold War period. 
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Inter versus intra-state conflict: Next we divide the conflict variable into inter and intra-
state (civil war) conflict. The results (reported in Table 10) are much stronger for the intra-
state conflict variable. Conflict has a greater negative impact on state’s fiscal capacity under 
civil war than with inter-state conflict as measured by the tax/GDP ratio. The introduction 
of the Polity and Political Repression variables in Table 10 (not reported here) do not 
qualitatively change the overall results. War may no longer contribute to state building, but 
ultimately Charles Tilly may have rightly discerned that state building remains a quasi-
criminal activity; a process which may not require the development of fiscal capacity as 
long as other avenues of coercing resources remain open to those who govern.  
 
Ethnicity: We now see the impact of ethnicity on the state’s fiscal capacity by including an 
index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Ethnic fragmentation may have an independent 
negative impact on tax capacity besides being a cause of civil war. Therefore, we look at its 
independent effect, as well as interacting the variable with Conflict. This is because we have 
civil war as an independent variable, and the information contained in civil war already 
contains information on ethnic division as a cause of war.  
 
The Fractionalization dataset was compiled by Alberto Alesina and associates, and 
measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in various countries. 
In other words, it measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a 
country are from different ethno-linguistic groups. The dataset was used in Alesina et al. 
(2003) to test the effects of fractionalization on the quality of institutions and economic 
growth.  This measure of ethnic fragmentation takes into account not only language but 
also racial characteristics (ethnicity) and religion. The indices are computed as one minus 
the Herfindahl index of group shares. Data on the ethnicity indices are taken from the 
Macro Data Guide website. 
 
The results are shown in Table 11. The base GMM equation from Tables 3 and 7 is 
reproduced in column 1. The impact of ethnicity as well as the interaction of ethnicity and 
conflict variable are shown in column 2 in Table 11. The results show that the Ethnicity 
variable is statistically insignificant. The interaction term, though positive, is also 
statistically insignificant. In column 3, the ethnicity equation is re-estimated after dropping 
both the conflict and the ethnicity/conflict interaction variable.  Now the ethnicity variable 
turns out to be negative and statistically significant. 
 
 
Oil and Gas Exporter Dummy: We now add an oil and gas exporter dummy to the base 
model. This dummy is also taken independently as well as interacted with the Conflict 
variable. The conflict variable is dropped from the two estimated equations reported in 
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column 4 and 5 in Table 11. The Oil/Gas Dummy has a statistically significant negative 
impact. The interaction terms is also negative and statistically significant. Oil exporting 
countries appear to depend less on domestic resource mobilization. When the equation is 
re-estimated by dropping both the Conflict and the interaction of the Dummy and Conflict 
variable, the Oil/Gas Dummy variable gains in both magnitude and significance. 
 
Foreign Aid: Finally, the base equation is re-estimated by adding a Foreign Aid variable. 
Data on Foreign Aid is taken from the OECD/DAC database. The resulting estimates are 
given in Table 12. The Foreign Aid variable is negative and statistically significant. This 
supports the view that inflow of Foreign Aid tends to replace the fiscal capacity of the state.  
 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
In this paper we examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing 
countries, measured by tax revenue ratios to GDP. We build a simple theoretical model of a 
factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common interest public goods, along 
with the possibility of violent contestation over a rent or prize, typically in the form of 
natural resource revenues. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis on the determinants of 
fiscal capacity is applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980-2010. Results indicate 
that war, especially in its current dominant form of civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along 
with imperfect democracy, political repression, the quality of governance and 
macroeconomic mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state 
capacity. Countries experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter 
more for fiscal capacity formation compared to war. The diminution of state capacity due to 
war appears less pronounced after the end of the cold war.  
  
Nations receiving more external development assistance and those countries who rely 
more on oil and gas exports have less incentives to develop fiscal (tax) capacity. This 
finding has similarities to Ross (2003), who finds a negative impact of oil and gas 
abundance on democratic development. Oil and gas endowments can also be a major cause 
of outright conflict as our theoretical model suggests. Greater ethnic fractionalization also 
retards fiscal capacity, perhaps because of a diminished interest in common interest public 
goods as also suggested by our theoretical model.   
 
The findings have important policy implications for a large number of countries that 
have faced various forms of civil unrest and armed rebellion.  First, measures to reduce 
conflict are not only desirable from a humanitarian perspective, they also have positive 
effects on economic development. Therefore the prevention and resolution of conflict—
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through democratization, better peace-keeping, and broad-based reconstruction—need 
more support from the international community. Second, it follows that revenue-enhancing 
reform will have more positive effects when complemented by conflict-reducing measures. 
The benefits of reform to the countries themselves will be higher, and the effectiveness of 
aid in support of such reform will also be greater. Third, while it is highly desirable to 
eliminate conflict entirely—from both humanitarian and economic-development 
perspectives—we have shown that there are still substantial gains from the more modest 
objective of lowering the level of conflict (from either high intensity to medium intensity, or 
from medium intensity to low intensity). This is encouraging given the longstanding and 
complex nature of many conflicts in poor countries, and the time and effort which is often 
required to achieve complete peace. 
 
We find that civil war does not promote the fiscal capacity of the state in contemporary 
developing countries unlike the findings of Charles Tilly for inter-state war in European 
history. This may be attributable to the destructive influence of civil war on political and 
economic institutions, as well as the possibility that civil war further retards the 
development of common interest public goods. Ultimately, however, Charles Tilly may have 
got it right---state building remains a quasi-criminal activity; a process which may not 
require the development of fiscal capacity as long as alternative avenues of coercive 
resources remain open to those who govern.   
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Appendix 
 
The sample includes the following 79 countries. The letter ‘c’ within parentheses besides a 
country denotes the countries with conflict. 
African countries 
Algeria (c)    Ghana    Rwanda (c) 
Angola (c)    Guinea-Bissau (c)  Senegal (c) 
Burkina Faso    Kenya    Sierra Leone (c) 
Burundi (c)    Lesotho (c)   Somalia (c) 
Cameroon (c)    Liberia (c)   South Africa (c) 
Chad (c)    Malawi   Sudan (c) 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (c)   Mali (c)   Tanzania 
Congo, Rep. of (c)   Morocco   Togo 
Côte d’Ivoire    Mozambique (c)  Tunisia (c) 
Eritrea (c)    Niger (c)   Uganda (c) 
Ethiopia (c)    Nigeria   Zambia 
Non-African countries 
Argentina    Guatemala (c)   Mexico 
Azerbaijan (c)    Haiti (c)   Myanmar (c) 
Bangladesh    Honduras   Nepal (c) 
Bolivia     India (c)   Nicaragua (c) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (c)  Indonesia (c)   Pakistan (c) 
Brazil     Iran (c)   Paraguay 
Cambodia (c)    Iraq (c)   Peru (c) 
Chile     Israel (c)   Philippines (c) 
Colombia (c)    Jamaica   Singapore 
Costa Rica    Laos (c)   Sri Lanka (c) 
Croatia (c)    Lebanon (c)   Thailand 
Dominican Republic   Libya (c)   Uruguay 
Ecuador    Macedonia (c)   Venezuela (c) 
Egypt (c)    Madagascar   Yemen (c) 
El Salvador (c)   Malaysia    
Georgia (c)    Maldives    
Variables and Data Source: 
 
Observations in the panel dataset used in the study are collected for all  79 countries for 
which data were available for the 1980-2010 period. The data is averaged over 5-year 
periods in order to generate balanced regression equations. The periods are 1981-1985, 
1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010. 
Data Source: 
Per capita GDP (constant US dollar, 2000): World Development Indicators 
GDP constant US dollar, 2000:  World Development Indicators 
Trade openness ((import+export)/GDP): World Development Indicators 
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Dual Exchange market dummy:  Annual report on exchange/arrangements, and exchange 
restrictions, IMF 
 
 
Economic Freedom Indicator: Gwartney, Lawson, and Block (1996) were among the first 
to systematically quantify in each country those tangible characteristics reflecting various 
aspects of these basic categories of economic freedoms and aggregate them into a single 
index of economic freedom, herein referred to as the EFI. Appendix A contains a list from 
Gwartney and Lawson (2011) of the specific measures of institutional characteristics  that 
comprise the EFI. This index has been created for over 120 countries and has been updated 
every five years starting in 1975, and then annually starting in 2000. The EFI value for each 
country ranges from 1.0 (the least economic freedoms) to 10.0 (the greatest economic 
freedoms). Many studies using this index have found empirical support for the argument 
that societies adopting institutions that retain higher levels of economic freedoms have 
achieved higher levels of economic growth (for a thorough survey, see Berggren, 2003). 
 
The Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFI) was designed by James Gwartney and 
Robert Lawson and is published periodically (annually since the year 2000) by the Fraser 
Institute. The index ranges from 1 (the least 
amount of economic freedom) to 10 (the highest amount of economic freedom). The latest 
index was published in 2003 and can be found at: www.freetheworld.com/. Gwartney and 
Lawson use empirically observed values from within these seven categories to derive an 
index representing a relative measure of economic freedom. The following is an 
abbreviated description of the five major components and their respective subcomponents 
that are used to derive the EFI. 
 
1. Size of a country’s government (relative to the whole economy): 
a. Expenditures as a percentage of total consumption 
b. Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP  
c. Government enterprises and investment as a percent of total investment 
d. Top marginal income tax rate 
 
2. The country’s legal structure (rule of law) and security of property rights: 
a. Evidence of judicial independence 
b. Evidence of impartial courts 
c. Protection of intellectual property 
d. Military interference in the rule of law 
e. Integrity of the legal system 
 
3. Access to sound money: 
a. Average annual growth rate of money supply less average growth rate of GDP 
b. Inflation rate 
c. Inflation rate variability 
d. Freedom to own foreign currency 
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4. Freedom to trade internationally: 
a. Taxes on international trade 
b. Regulatory trade barriers 
c. Actual versus expected size of the of trade sector of the economy 
d. Difference between official and actual currency exchange rates 
e. Extent of international capital market controls 
 
5. Regulation of credit, labor, and business: 
a. Credit market regulations: interest rate controls, privatization of banks, etc. 
b. Labor market regulations: wage restrictions, hiring/firing restrictions, military 
conscription, etc. 
c. Business regulations: price controls, licensing restrictions, etc. 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) has recorded ongoing violent conflicts since the 
1970s. The data provided is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global 
armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts 
are systematically defined and studied. Data source: Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen, 
(2011), and updated  using data from The Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP)http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ 
Conflict 
Low intensity armed conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 
1000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict. 
Medium intensity armed conflict: at least 25 battle related deaths per year and an 
accumulated total of at least 1000 deaths, but fewer than 1000 deaths per year. 
High intensity armed conflict: at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year.  
Political Repression: The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures levels of political violence 
and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale” 
originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index comes from 
two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the U.S. 
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
Political Terror Scale 
Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place 
no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideologoical 
goals.  
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Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the 
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its 
generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves 
in politics or ideas. 
Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. 
Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 
Level 2: There is limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is 
rare. 
Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, 
and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
Source: www.politicalterrorscale.org 
 
Fractionalization:  
The Fractionalization dataset was compiled by Alberto Alesina and associates (see Alesina 
et al (2003)), and measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in 
various countries. This measure of ethnic fragmentation is a broad classification of groups 
taking into account not only language but also racial characteristics (ethnicity) and religion. 
The indices are computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of group shares. 
 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1 
 
Foreign Aid: 
Data on the flow of foreign aid is taken from the OECD/DAC database 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) publishes statistics and reports on aid and 
other resource flows to developing countries, based principally on reporting by DAC 
Members, multilateral organisations and other donors. The data are collected via two 
reporting systems: 
 The DAC aggregates on aid, other official flows and private flows, including a 
breakdown on type of aid extended, geographical distribution, sectoral breakdown 
and tying status of aid. 
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 The Creditor Reporting System (CRS) aid activity database, which contains 
detailed quantitative and descriptive data on individual aid projects and 
programmes. CRS data are used to analyse the sectoral and geographical 
breakdown of aid for selected years and donors, to examine aid that promotes 
specific policy objectives (gender equality, environmental sustainability, untying, 
aid for trade) and to monitor donors’ compliance with various international 
recommendations in the field of development co-operation. 
 
Oil/Gas Exporting countries: 
 
The list of oil and gas exporting countries is taken from the database of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) 
http://www.iea.org/ 
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Table 2 
 
The Tax Revenue (TAX) variable and countries with different conflict intensity (n=51) 
 
Level of Conflict Intensity  Tax Revenue (TAX)  No. of Countries 
 
Low [1]    0.257*  (2.66)    11 
 
Medium [2]    0.142*  (2.35)    17 
 
High [3]    0.065* (2.02)    23 
 
F-value    10.58* 
 
 
Note: An asterisk * next to the TAX variable indicates that the average value is significantly 
different from the average value shown next below, at the 5 percent level. The figures in 
parentheses () show the t-statistics which are all significant at least at the 5 percent level. 
An asterisk next to the F-value shows that it exceeds the critical value, which is 3.1 in this 
case. Figures in [] next to each level of conflict intensity show the number used to measure 
that particular level of intensity in the data set.  
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Table 3 
    Estimation Results 
 
Variable Cross Section  Fixed Effects  System GMM   
 
Constant     3.66 (2.90)    8.54 (5.33)    12.24 (6.20)   
 
Conflict      -0.08 (0.98)  -1.54 (4.90)   -1.84 (5.63)    
 
Log(GDP PC)       0.11 (1.65)   0.85 (3.26)    0.54 (3.74)     
 
Log(GDP)      0.10 (0.88)    0.46 (2.19)    0.78 (2.94)     
 
Inflation      -1.13 (4.24)  -1.69 (3.77)   -1.20 (4.12)    
 
Dual Ex Rate       3.62 (1.21)  -1.64 (4.20)   -1.33 (4.59)    
 
Trade        0.088 (2.06) -0.67 (2.69)  -0.49 (3.23)         
 
EFI       1.48 (5.62)    3.72 (6.80)   3.90 (7.42))      
 
Africa*Conflict    -0.18 (2.45)  -0.08 (2.00)    
 
1st order Serial Corr. (p-value)       0.412        0.06  
2nd order Serial Corr. (p-value)          0.43 
Years Indicator       Yes         Yes          
Country Fixed Effect       Yes         Yes          
AR(1) p-value             0.014 
AR(2) p-value             0.336 
Hansen test for           14.68 (0.18) 
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 
Sargan Test (p-value)           0.26    
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)          0.24  
Number of countries         79     79    79    
Number of observations    528 514    510    
 
 Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the t-
statistics. 
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Table 4 
 
Effect of Long-run Impact Multipliers on Tax Revenue (TAX) 
 
                        Intensity of Conflict                  . 
Variables  High  Medium  Low   No Conflict  
 
Conflict  1.12  1.19   0.91           ------ 
 
GDP   0.68  1.40   1.05            1.25 
 
Inflation  0.88  0.90   0.86             0.77 
 
EFI   1.04  1.65   1.20             1.84 
 
Note: The figures represent the percentage change in financial development due to a unit 
change in each of the explanatory variables 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
        Ranking of Variables in order of long run impact on financial development 
 
                     Intensity of Conflict                    . 
High   Medium  Low   No Conflict  
 
Conflict  EFI   EFI   EFI 
EFI   GDP   GDP   GDP    
Inflation  Conflict  Conflict  Inflation 
GDP   Inflation  Inflation 
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Table 6 
 System GMM Estimation Results 
 
Variable  Base Equation Column 2         Column 3            
 
Constant         12.24 (6.20)  11.16 (5.10)   8.70 (3.62)  
 
Conflict         -1.84 (5.63)   -1.24 (4.12)    ---- 
 
Log(GDP PC)     0.54 (3.74)  0.19 (2.66)   0.60 (8.32) 
 
Log(GDP)          0.78 (2.94)    1.14 (3.17)   1.32 (6.14) 
 
Inflation         -1.20 (4.12)   -0.66 (2.11)   -0.15 (1.60) 
 
Dual Ex Rate          -1.33 (4.59)   -1.08 (1.99)   -0.78 (3.76) 
 
Trade    -0.49 (3.23)  -1.25 (3.16)   -0.88 (2.94) 
 
EFI         3.90 (7.42))     -----    2.78 (6.44) 
Africa*Conflict  -0.08 (2.00)  -0.06 (2.44)   -0.63 (4.99)   
 
POLITY      1.60 (3.74)   ---- 
Political Repression         -2.15 (5.97) 
 
1st order Serial Corr. (p-value) 0.06       0.10   0.18 
2nd order Serial Corr. (p-value) 0.43       0.76   0.84 
Years Indicator       Yes        Yes          Yes 
Country Fixed Effect       Yes        Yes    Yes 
AR(1) p-value    0.014     0.023   0.114 
AR(2) p-value       0.336     0.166   0.186 
Hansen test for   14.68 (0.18)   24.10 (0.34)   22.18 (0.30) 
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 
Sargan Test (p-value)    0.26   0.34    0.38 
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)   0.24   0.36    0.24 
Number of countries      79   79    76 
Number of observations      510  510    484 
 
 Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the t-
statistics. 
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Table 7 
 System GMM Estimation Results 
 
Variable  Base Equation Column 2         Column 3            
 
Constant         12.24 (6.20)  8.23 (5.11)   9.60 (6.12) 
 
Conflict         -1.84 (5.63)  -1.24 (4.66)   ------ 
 
Log(GDP PC)     0.54 (3.74)  0.22 (3.88)   0.66 (3.90) 
 
log(GDP)          0.78 (2.94)   1.30 (3.26)   2.11 (5.12) 
 
Inflation         -1.20 (4.12)   -0.88 (3.55)   -1.16 (4.20) 
 
Dual Ex Rate          -1.33 (4.59)  -1.70 (5.90)   -0.86 (4.10) 
 
Trade    -0.49 (3.23)  -1.65 (4.58)   -0.68 (3.24) 
 
EFI         3.90 (7.42)   4.77 (8.44)   -----   
Africa*Conflict  -0.08 (2.00)   -0.74 (3.22)    -1.19 (4.16) 
 
POLITY   -----   ------    3.12 (6.80) 
Political Repression  -----   ------     
President dummy       -----              -0.39 (1.23)   -.09 (1.06) 
      
1st order Serial Corr. (p-value) 0.06  0.12    0.09      
2nd order Serial Corr. (p-value) 0.43  0.16        0.17 
Years Indicator       Yes  Yes      Yes 
Country Fixed Effect       Yes  Yes    Yes        
AR(1) p-value    0.014  0.022    0.018  
AR(2) p-value       0.336   0.241    0.187 
Hansen test for   14.68 (0.18)   12.20 (0.16)   10.65 (0.14)    
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 
Sargan Test (p-value)    0.26  0.18    0.18  
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)   0.24  0.14    0.13   
Number of countries      79  79    76   
Number of observations      510  510    484 
 
 Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the t-
statistics. 
34 
 
 
Table 8: System GMM Estimation: Cold War Period 1980-1990 
 
Variable        Column 1          Column 2       Column 3              Column 4 
 
Constant 3.24 (4.14)       4.92 (5.10)  3.22 (2.90)  4.10 (3.88) 
 
Conflict -3.68 (4.55)     -4.34 (4.80) ------   ------- 
 
Log (GDP PC) 0.84 (2.40)      1.26 (3.13)  1.07 (3.20)  0.98 (2.34) 
 
Log (GDP) 0.36 (2.10)    0.47 (2.48)  0.65 (2.98)  0.32 (2.33) 
 
Inflation -0.88 (1.98)     -1.18 (2.44) -1.13 (2.10)  -0.68 (3.00) 
 
Dual Ex Rate -3.80 (4.49)    -3.57 (6.10)  -3.28 (4.87)  -2.10 (4.29) 
 
Trade  -1.15 (3.77)  -0.74 (3.99)  -0.88 (3.20)  -0.98 (3.11) 
 
EFI  2.48 (7.10)    ------   1.55 (4.40)   -------- 
 
Africa*Conflict  -0.26 (3.77)     -0.58 (4.57) --------   -------- 
 
POLITY  -----------    1.76 (7.44)  --------   1.30 (3.48) 
 
Political Repression  ---- ------    -2.46 (5.55)  -3.87 (7.43) 
 
 
# of Countries 79  79   76   76 
# of observation 235 235   225   225 
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Table 9: System GMM Estimation: Post-Cold War Period 1990-2010 
 
Variable         Column 1          Column 2       Column 3              Column 4 
 
Constant   2.15 (2.88)        4.14 (3.10)     4.33 (4.16)  3.77 (4.72) 
 
Conflict  -1.57 (2.87)      -1.76 (2.63)  -----        ----- 
 
Log (GDP PC)   1.18 (4.33)     2.84 (4.19)   1.86 (3.20)  2.28 (4.27) 
 
Log (GDP)  2.65 (4.88)   4.17 (7.54)  3.10 (5.28)  365 (4.82)  
 
Inflation  -1.77 (3.86) -0.76 (2.90)  -1.05 (4.66)  -1.00 (3.76) 
 
Dual Ex Rate  -3.24 (5.88) -2.85 (5.77)  -3.19 (5.50)  -2.65 (4.38)  
 
Trade   -1.23 (3.10) -1.65 (3.38)  -1.09 (4.34)  -1.88 (4.98) 
 
EFI   1.38 (2.55)  ------   1.09 (2.07)   ------  
 
Africa*Conflict   -1.15 (3.99)   -2.09 (4.38)  -------   ------- 
 
POLITY   -----------    2.86 (6.83)  --------   3.22 (7.40) 
 
Political Repression   ----  ------    -1.55 (3.88)  -1.38 (2.39) 
 
 
# of Countries  79  79   76   76 
# of observation  314 314   304   304 
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Table 10: System GMM Estimation: Intra versus Inter-state conflict 
 
Variable         Intra-state          Inter-state        
 
Constant   1.84 (3.15)  2.20 (3.44)      
 
Conflict  -2.45 (4.18)  -0.36 (2.15)   
 
Log (GDP PC)   0.96 (5.14)  1.14 (5.36)   
 
Log (GDP)  1.11 (3.02)  0.68 (1.98)    
 
Inflation  -0.48 (1.94)  -0.04 (1.47)  
 
Dual Exch Rate -1.20 (2.36)  -2.44 (2.90) 
   
Trade   -0.15 (1.77)  -0.97 (1.53)   
 
EFI   2.46 (5.80)  1.90 (3.77)     
 
Africa*Conflict   -1.49 (3.60)  -1.74 (2.48) 
 
 
# of Countries 25     42    
# of observation     
37 
 
Table 11 
System GMM Estimation Results: Ethnicity & Oil and Gas Exporter Dummy 
 
 
Variable Base Equation Ethnicity       Ethnicity Oil/Gas  Oil/Gas            
 
Constant       12.24 (6.20) 6.22 (3.45) 7.15 (3.91) 4.70 (2.56) 3.66 (2.90) 
 
Conflict         -1.84 (5.63)       ---         ---      ---      --- 
 
Log(GDP PC)    0.54 (3.74) 0.45 (2.68) 0.64 (3.14) 0.31 (2.96) 0.70 (3.03) 
 
log(GDP)         0.78 (2.94)  2.44 (5.34) 1.80 (3.96) 1.98 (5.76) 1.04 (3.80) 
 
Inflation        -1.20 (4.12)  -0.65 (2.65) -1.02 (4.40) -1.50 (3.70) -1.94 (3.70) 
 
Dual Ex Rate         -1.33 (4.59) -0.87 (3.90) -1.15 (4.16) -1.12 (4.39) -1.35 (3.66) 
 
Trade   -0.49 (3.23) -1.54 (4.10) -0.63 (3.80) -0.76 (3.87) -0.85 (2.38) 
 
EFI        3.90 (7.42)  2.35 (5.54) 2.40 (6.60)  2.75 (6.10) 1.80 (4.33) 
 
Ethnicity          ---  -0.74 (1.11) -0.82 (2.04)          ---          --- 
Oil/Gas Dummy          ---           ---         ---  -1.12 (3.46) -2.64 (4.15) 
Africa*Conflict  -0.08 (2.00)  -0.43 (3.72) -0.36 (2.14)  -0.64 (3.65) -0.49 (3.04) 
Ethnicity*Conflict         ---    0.65 (1.45)        ---           ---          --- 
Oil/Gas*Conflict          ---           ---         ---  -0.18 (2.35)         --- 
 
      
1st order Serial Corr.(p-value)  0.06  0.10  0.04  0.10        0.07     
2nd order Serial Corr. (p-value)0.43  0.22       0.18  0.27       0.34 
Years Indicator            Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes       Yes 
Country Fixed Effect           Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes       Yes 
AR(1) p-value            0.014  0.009  0.008  0.011        0.017 
AR(2) p-value            0.336   0.190  0.236  0.202        0.226 
Hansen test for  14.68 (0.18)   13.11 (0.17)  12.84 (.12) 9.35 (0.11)   11.14 (0.13)    
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 
Sargan Test (p-value)         0.26  0.12  0.17  0.12          0.17 
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)  0.24  0.19  0.20  0.22         0.22 
Number of countries     79  79  79  76         76 
Number of observations   510  510  510  480        480 
 
 Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the t-statistics. 
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Table 12 
System GMM Estimation Results: Foreign Aid 
 
 
Variable  Base Equation Foreign Aid             
 
Constant         12.24 (6.20)  7.88 (4.14) 
 
Conflict         -1.84 (5.63)  -1.16 (3.84)    
 
Log(GDP PC)     0.54 (3.74)  0.71 (3.18)    
 
log(GDP)          0.78 (2.94)   1.53 (3.17)    
 
Inflation         -1.20 (4.12)   -0.92 (3.36)    
 
Dual Ex Rate          -1.33 (4.59)  -1.94 (5.22)    
 
Trade    -0.49 (3.23)  -0.46 (3.14)    
 
EFI         3.90 (7.42)   2.14 (6.36)     
 
Africa*Conflict  -0.08 (2.00)   -0.36 (2.37)     
 
Foreign Aid         ---   -1.99 (4.15) 
      
1st order Serial Corr. (p-value) 0.06      0.09      
2nd order Serial Corr. (p-value) 0.43      0.36          
Years Indicator       Yes      Yes       
Country Fixed Effect       Yes      Yes            
AR(1) p-value    0.014      0.011      
AR(2) p-value       0.336      0.288     
Hansen test for   14.68 (0.18)      12.18 (0.17)       
Overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 
Sargan Test (p-value)    0.26     0.19      
Difference Sargan Test (p-value)   0.24     0.21       
Number of countries      79     79       
Number of observations      510     510     
 
 Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the t-
statistics. 
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